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Abstract—Federated Learning rests on the notion of training a
global model distributedly on various devices. Under this setting,
users’ devices perform computations on their own data and then
share the results with the cloud server to update the global model.
A fundamental issue in such systems is to effectively incentivize
user participation. The users suffer from privacy leakage of their
local data during the federated model training process. Without
well-designed incentives, self-interested users will be unwilling
to participate in federated learning tasks and contribute their
private data. To bridge this gap, in this paper, we adopt the
game theory to design an effective incentive mechanism, which
selects users that are most likely to provide reliable data and
compensates for their costs of privacy leakage. We formulate
our problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game and solve the
game’s equilibrium. Effectiveness of the proposed mechanism is
demonstrated by extensive simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing popularity of machine learning, it is
expected that the data-driven intelligent applications will soon
be employed in all aspects of our daily life, including medical
care, food and agriculture, transportation systems, etc. In
traditional machine learning methods, the key of training an
accurate model is to collect a sufficient amount of data, which
may contain private information about individuals. If such data
is disclosed or used for other purposes other than those initially
intended, individual’s privacy will be compromised. Indeed,
data privacy is emerging as one of the most serious concerns
of machine learning. Many data owners are reluctant to share
their private data for the purpose of machine learning. To
promote private data circulation, data brokers such as Acxiom
[1] have emerged to bridge the gap between data owners and
data consumers. Basically, the data brokers offer monetary
rewards to incentivize data owners to contribute private data
and then charge data consumers for their queries over the
collected data [2]. This practice, however, has two fundamental
issues: 1) data owners have no control of data privacy after
transferring private data to the data broker; 2) the data broker
has to take full responsibility of protecting users’ data which
is costly and may damage the reputation of the data broker if
data breach occurs.
Recently, federated learning has attracted increasing atten-
tions due to its significant advantages in privacy protection. It
unleashes a new collaborative ecosystem in machine learning
to train a global model while keeping the training data locally
on users’ devices. The participating devices send the model
updates computed on their raw data to a cloud server iteratively
to update the global model. Comparing with the data broker
systems, federated learning systems only consist of a cloud
server (i.e., the data consumer) and a number of devices/users
(i.e., the data owners). The cloud server has no control of
users’ raw data but only collects intermediate model updates
from users, which contain much less sensitive information than
raw data. Since data never leaves users’ devices, the cloud
server has no responsibility to maintain and protect the user’s
raw data. Therefore, federated learning is a promising tool for
training machine learning models on private data.
Federated learning successfully mitigates users’ concerns
over privacy leakage by allowing devices to keep their data
locally and only exchange ephemeral model updates. However,
it still has privacy issues [3]. For example, by observing the
model updates from a device, attackers are able to recover the
private dataset in that device using the reconstruction attack [4]
or infer whether a sample is in the dataset of that device using
the membership inference attack [5]. Especially, if the server
is not fully trusted, it can easily infer the private information
of users from the received model updates during the training
by employing existing attack methods. Considering such risks,
self-interested devices/users will be unwilling to participate in
federated learning tasks.
To motivate users with sensitive data to participate in feder-
ated learning tasks, the server should provide rigorous privacy
guarantees for participants. Recent studies have specifically
focused on solving the privacy issues in distributed learn-
ing scenarios. Among them, secure multi-party computation
or homomorphic encryption is one of the popular methods
which prevents attackers outside the system from obtaining
the local computation results [6]. However, these methods
cannot prevent the privacy leakage from the final learned
model. Besides, differential privacy [7] has become the de-
facto standard for privacy notion and is being increasingly
adopted in private distributed learning systems (see [8], [9],
[10] and references therein). However, most of these existing
works made an optimistic assumption that there are enough
users who are willing to participate in federated learning when
invited, which is not practical due to the privacy concern of
users. Without well-designed economic reward, users will be
reluctant to join the learning. Therefore, it is essential for the
server to design an efficient incentive mechanism to attract
more user participation. There are several papers that have
studied the incentive design for federated learning considering
the communication and computation cost of users [11], [12],
but none of them consider the privacy issue.
In this paper, we propose a game-theory based incentive
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mechanism to motivate users with private data to participate
in federated learning tasks with rigorous privacy guarantee. In
our mechanism, the server compensates users for contributing
their private data, according to their privacy budgets. Users
who have a larger privacy budget for the federated learning
task will get higher payment from the server. Each user selects
its desired privacy budget to maximize its own utility, and
the server selects the reward for users such that its utility is
maximized.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study
the incentive mechanism that motivates users with private
data to participate in federated learning tasks.
• Our proposed incentive mechanism features the properties
of differential privacy to quantify the privacy loss and
compensates participants in a satisfying manner.
• We perform extensive simulations to demonstrate the
effectiveness of our incentive mechanism.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the data trading system for on-device
federated learning tasks. Then, we formulate the utilities of
the server and users in federated learning tasks in Section III.
In Section IV, we present our incentive mechanism based on
the game theory. Numerical results are presented in Section V
followed by the conclusions in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODELING
In this section, we first describe the basic architecture of
trading private data for federated learning tasks. Then, we
present more details on conducting the on-device federated
training.
A. Data Trading Process
We use Figure 1 to aid our description of the data trading
system for federated learning. The system consists of a cloud
server, which aims to learn a machine learning model θ ∈
Rd, and many devices which are able to communicate with
the cloud server. We assume that these devices are owned
by different users. The server first publicizes the federated
learning task description. Assume that there is set of users
U = {1, 2, . . . , n} interested in joining the task after reading
the task description, where n ≥ 2. Each user in U has a local
dataset Di, i ∈ U . A user participating in the task will incur
a privacy loss to be elaborated later. Therefore, it expects a
payment in return for its service. Taking the privacy loss and
payment into consideration, each user determines how much
privacy budget it will give to this learning task and submits
its plan to the server. After receiving all the privacy budget
plans from users, the server computes the payment for each
user and sends the payments to the users. The chosen users
(whose payment is positive) will conduct the federated model
training process. This completes the whole process of trading
private data for federated learning tasks. In the following, we
further specify the details of each step.
Cloud Server
Learning task description
Privacy budget
Payment
Model training
Devices
Figure 1: Data trading system for federated learning tasks.
1) Learning task description: At the very beginning, the
cloud server broadcasts the description of a federated learning
task to all users. The description includes: 1) the goal of this
task, e.g., classify different pets; 2) the category of the data
needed for the task, e.g., images, videos or voices of pets; 3)
the loss function f to be used; 4) the type of query Q for
users, e.g., the gradient of loss computed on local data; 5) the
privacy compensation function for users; 6) the total reward
R > 0 for all participants.
2) Privacy budget: According to the task description, each
user decides its plan of privacy budget. The (, δ)-differential
privacy (DP) [7] is a commonly-used concept to quantify the
privacy loss in private machine learning algorithms [13], [14].
Here, instead of directly using the (, δ)-DP, we utilize its
relaxed version, the ρ-zero-concentrated differential privacy
(ρ-zCDP), which has a tight composition bound and is more
suitable to analyze the end-to-end privacy loss of iterative
algorithms. Based on the concept of ρ-zCDP, we assume that
user i chooses its privacy budget ρi > 0 for this learning
task. Larger ρi implies more privacy loss. In the following,
we provide several important properties of ρ-zCDP [15]:
Lemma 1. Let g : x → R be any real-valued function with
sensitivity ∆2(g), then the Gaussian mechanism, which returns
g(x) +N (0, σ2), satisfies ∆2(g)2/(2σ2)-zCDP.
Lemma 2. Suppose two mechanisms satisfy ρ1-zCDP and ρ2-
zCDP, then their composition satisfies ρ1 + ρ2-zCDP.
3) Payment: After collecting all the privacy budgets from
users, the server computes the payment for each user based
on the total reward and privacy compensation function, which
is denoted by pi. In the rest of this paper, we utilize the
privacy compensation function which assigns payments to
users proportionally to their privacy budgets, i.e.,
pi =
ρi∑
i∈U ρi
R. (1)
We can observe that the payment of a user depends on not
only the total reward R but also the privacy budgets of other
users.
4) Model training: After the user received its payment,
it will start the federated model training process under the
coordination of the server. The federated training is an iterative
process. At each iteration, the server sends a query to each
user, and each user computes the received query on its local
data. To protect their privacy, users perturb their computation
results by adding random noise before sending them to the
server. More precisely, at iteration t, user i receives the query
Q(θt;Di) where θt represents the latest model parameter
maintained by the server and Di represents the dataset of user
i. Then, user i computes the query and upload a differentially-
private response to the server, i.e.,
Q˜(θt;Di) = Q(θt;Di) + bti, (2)
where bti ∈ Rd is a random vector drawn from the Gaussian
distribution N (0, σ2i 1d). This process repeats for T iterations.
The noise magnitude σi depends on user i’s privacy budget
and the number of iterations and is determined by the server.
B. Details on Private Federated Learning
Consider a federated learning setting that consists of a cloud
server and a set of users U which are able to communicate with
the server. Each user has a local dataset Di = {ξi1, . . . , ξim}, a
collection of m datapoints from its device. The users want to
collaboratively learn a global model θ using their data under
the orchestration of the cloud server. Specifically, the global
model θ is learned by minimizing the overall empirical risk
of the loss on the union of all local datasets, that is,
min
θ
f(θ) :=
1
|U|
∑
i∈U
fi(θ) with fi(θ) :=
1
m
∑
ξ∈Di
l(θ, ξ).
(3)
Here, fi(·) represents the local objective function of user i,
l(θ; ξ) is the loss of the model θ at a datapoint ξ sampled
from local dataset Di.
In the traditional distributed gradient descent approach that
solves Problem (3), the server collects the gradients of local
objectives from all users and updates the global model using
a gradient descent iteration given by
θt+1 = θt − η|U|
∑
i∈U
∇fi(θt), (4)
where θt represents the global model at iteration t, η is the
stepsize, and ∇fi(θt) := 1m
∑
ξ∈Di ∇l(θt, ξ) represents the
gradient of local objective function fi based on the local
dataset Di. In Algorithm 1, we summarize the process of
training the model θ in a private manner.
Algorithm 1 Private Federated Learning Algorithm
Input: number of iterations T , stepsize η, noise magnitude σi
1: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
2: for all users in U in parallel do
3: Download the query Q(θt;Di) = ∇fi(θt);
4: Return the DP-response Q˜(θt;Di) to the server;
5: end for
6: Server updates θt+1 ← θt − η|U|
∑
i∈U Q˜(θt;Di).
7: end for
III. UTILITIES OF THE SERVER AND USERS
At the beginning of the data trading process for federated
learning tasks, the server needs to determine the total reward
R for this task. Since users are selfish but rational, they will
select their privacy budgets to maximize their own utilities
and will not join in the learning task unless there is sufficient
incentive. The server is only interested in maximizing its own
utility, hence our goal is to design a mechanism for the server
to choose the best strategy considering users’ decisions during
the data trading process. In this section, we formulate the
utilities of the server and users, respectively.
A. Utility of User
In the learning task description, the server announces a total
reward R to motivate users. Then, each user will decide its
level of participation, i.e., its privacy budget. The goal of each
user is to determine the optimal privacy budget ρi that maxi-
mizes its utility. Denote the privacy cost of user i as a function
of c(νi, ρi), where νi > 0 is the privacy value parameter.
According to the privacy compensation function (1), the utility
of user i can be formulated as:
Ui =
ρi∑
i∈U ρi
R− c(νi, ρi). (5)
Note that, each user’s privacy cost function belongs to the
same publicly known family, but the privacy value parameter
νi is known only to the user and must be reported to the
mechanism. We require that the family of cost functions admits
a total ordering independently of ρi, i.e., for any j 6= k and
for any ρi > 0, it should hold that c(ν
j
i , ρi) ≤ c(νki , ρi) if and
only if νji ≤ νki . Natural choices of such privacy cost functions
can be linear functions which take the form c(νi, ρi) = νiρi,
exponential functions of the form c(νi, ρi) = exp(νiρi), and
quadratic cost functions of the form c(νi, ρi) = νiρ2i . In this
paper, we assume all users use the linear privacy cost function.
B. Utility of Server
The goal of the server is to choose the optimal reward R
that maximizes its utility. The utility of the server relies on
the training result, i.e., the performance of the trained model,
and the reward it paid to participants. In our system, only
the privacy budgets will impact the model performance via
the Gaussian noise added to the model parameter at each
iteration. Therefore, we are only interested in capturing the
influence of users’ privacy budgets on the model performance.
It is impossible to obtain the exact accuracy of a trained
model before conducting the training. Instead, we analyze the
influence of the privacy budget on the convergence property
of the federated learning task, which implies the expected
performance of the trained model.
We first observe the convergence property of Algorithm 1.
Assume that global loss function f is L-smooth, so that the
loss gap between two iterations is
f(θt+1)−f(θt) ≤ 〈∇f(θt),θt+1−θt〉+L
2
‖θt+1−θt‖2. (6)
Taking the expectation of the loss gap over the Gaussian noise,
we have
E
[
f(θk+1)− f(θk)] ≤ − η|U|∑
i∈U
〈∇f(θk),Q(θt;Di)〉
+
Lη2
2|U|
∑
i∈U
E
[∥∥Q(θt;Di) + bti∥∥2] . (7)
As we have that
E
[∥∥Q(θt;Di) + bti∥∥2]
= E
[∥∥Q(θt;Di) + bti − E [Q(θt;Di) + bti]∥∥2]
+
∥∥E [Q(θt;Di) + bti]∥∥2
= E
[∥∥bti∥∥2]+ ∥∥Q(θt;Di)∥∥2 ,
the expectation of the loss gap becomes
E
[
f(θk+1)− f(θk)] ≤ − η|U|∑
i∈U
〈∇f(θk),Q(θt;Di)〉
+
Lη2
2|U|
∑
i∈U
∥∥Q(θt;Di)∥∥2 + Lη2
2|U|
∑
i∈U
E
[∥∥bti∥∥2] . (8)
From (8), we can see that the Gaussian noise adds extra
error on the loss at each iteration proportional to the size of
noise. Such errors will accumulate as more and more iterations
are involved. Indeed, with a fixed number of iterations, larger
loss error per iteration implies lower accuracy of the trained
model. If the error caused by the Gaussian noise is zero, i.e., no
noise is added to the local response, Algorithm 1 will achieve
the highest accuracy approaching 1. As the magnitude of the
Gaussian noise increases, the accuracy will drop to 0.5, which
is the probability of random guess. Given that E‖bti‖2 = dσ2i ,
the utility of the server can be formulated as follows:
Us =
λ
2
[
1 + exp
(
− 1|U|
∑
i∈U
log(1 + dη2σ2i )
)]
−R. (9)
Here, λ > 1 is the weight parameter. The first term represents
the influence of Gaussian noise on model accuracy. Specifi-
cally, its inner log term reflects the diminishing influence of
the noise, and its outer term bounds the accuracy in the range
of [0.5, 1].
In the following, we determine the magnitude of Gaussian
noise for each user. By Lemma 1, the magnitude of noise σi is
proportional to the sensitivity of the query function. Therefore,
we first compute the sensitivity of the query at each iteration,
which is given in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. The sensitivity of the query Q(θt;Di) for user
i at the t-th iteration is bounded by 2L/m.
Proof: For user i, given any two neighboring datasets Di
and D′i of size m that differ only in the j-th data sample, the
sensitivity of the query Q(θt;Di) is∥∥∥∥∥∥ 1m
∑
ξ∈Di
∇l(θt, ξ)− 1
m
∑
ξ∈D′i
∇l(θt, ξ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
1
m
∥∥∇l(θti ; ξj)−∇l(θti ; ξ′j)∥∥2 .
Since the loss function l(·) is L-smooth, the sensitivity of
Q(θt;Di) is bounded by 2L/m.
Given the sensitivity of the query and the privacy budget,
the server is able to calculate the magnitude of noise for each
user by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 achieves ρi-zCDP for user i if
the Gaussian noise bti at each iteration is sampled from
N (0, σ2i 1d), where
σi =
L
m
√
2T
ρi
. (10)
Proof: By Corollary 1 and Lemma 1, each iteration of
Algorithm 1 achieves 2L
2
m2σ2i
-zCDP for user i. By Lemma 2,
the overall zCDP guarantee for user i after T iterations is
ρi =
2TL2
m2σ2i
. Theorem 1 follows by simple rearrangement.
Then, the server’s utility function (9) can be rewritten as
Us =
λ
2
[
1 + exp
(
− 1|U|
∑
i∈U
log(1 +
2dη2T
ρim2
)
)]
−R, (11)
where we can see that the privacy budget ρi is proportional to
the model accuracy.
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM: A TWO-STAGE
STACKELBERG GAME
As we mentioned, the goal of the server and users is to
maximize their utilities. In this section, we model the incentive
mechanism as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Specifically, in
the first stage, the server announces its reward R; in the second
stage, each user strategizes its privacy budget to maximize its
own utility. Let ρ = {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρn} denote the strategy set
consisting of all users’ strategies. Let ρ−i denote the strategy
set excluding ρi.
The second stage can be considered as a non-cooperative
game. Therefore, given a reward R, there exists a stable
strategy for each user such that a user has nothing to gain by
unilaterally changing its current strategy which corresponds to
the concept of Nash Equilibrium in game theory.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). A set of strategies ρe =
{ρe1, ρe2, . . . , ρen} is a Nash Equilibrium of the second stage in
our Stackelberg Game if for any user i,
Ui(ρ
e
i , ρ
e
−i) ≥ Ui(ρi, ρe−i) (12)
for any ρi > 0, where Ui is defined in (5).
Given ρ−i, if a strategy maximizes Ui(ρi, ρ−i) over all ρi >
0, it is user i’s best strategy, denoted by βi(ρ−i). To study the
best strategy, we compute the derivatives of Ui with respect
to ρi:
∂Ui
∂ρi
=
−Rρi
(
∑
j∈U ρj)2
+
R∑
j∈U ρj
− νi, (13)
and
∂2Ui
∂ρ2i
=
−2R∑j∈U\{i} ρj
(
∑
j∈U ρj)3
< 0. (14)
We can see that the utility function Ui is a concave function
of ρi. Therefore, given any R > 0 and any strategy profile ρ−i
of other users, the best strategy βi(ρ−i) of user i is unique if
it exists. By setting (13) to zero, βi(ρ−i) satisfies that
βi(ρ−i) =
−∞, if R ≤ νi
∑
j∈U\{i} ρj ;√
R
∑
j∈U\{i} ρj
νi
−∑j∈U\{i} ρj , o.w. . (15)
Here, if the best strategy βi(ρ−i) is non-positive, user i
will not participate in the training by setting ρi = −∞ (to
avoid a deficit). The conclusion in (15) leads to the following
algorithm for computing the Nash Equilibrium of the second-
stage in our game.
Algorithm 2 Computation of the Nash Equilibrium
1: Sort users according to their privacy value, ν1 ≤ ν2 ≤
· · · ≤ νn;
2: S ← {1, 2}, i← 3;
3: while i ≤ n and νi ≤ νi+
∑
j∈S νj
|S| do
4: S ← S ∪ {i}, i← i+ 1;
5: end while
6: for i ∈ [n] do
7: if i ∈ S then
8: ρei =
(|S|−1)R∑
j∈S νj
(
1− (|S|−1)νi∑
j∈S νj
)
;
9: else
10: ρei = −∞;
11: end if
12: end for
13: return ρe = {ρe1, ρe2, . . . , ρen}
Based on Algorithm 2, we have the following observations:
1) νi ≥
∑
j∈S νj
|S|−1 , for any i /∈ S; 2)
∑
j∈S ρ
e
j =
(|S|−1)R∑
j∈S νj
;
and 3)
∑
j∈S\{i} ρ
e
j =
(|S|−1)2Rνi
(
∑
j∈S νj)2
for any i ∈ S . According
to 1) and 2), we can obtain that for any i /∈ S, ρei = −∞
is its best strategy given ρei−, which satisfies the condition in
(15). Then, it is provable that for any i ∈ S , ρei is its best
strategy given ρei−. The detail of the proof is similar to the
proof of Theorem 1 in [16]. Accordingly, by Algorithm 2, we
can obtain the best strategy profile for users, i.e.,
βi(ρ−i) =
(|S| − 1)R∑
j∈S νj
(
1− (|S| − 1)νi∑
j∈S νj
)
(16)
if i ∈ S, and βi(ρ−i) = −∞ if i /∈ S.
On the basis of the above analysis, the server knows that
there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium for users for any given
value of R. Hence, by choosing an optimal R, the server is
able to maximize its utility Us. Substituting (16) into (11) and
considering ρi = −∞ if i /∈ S, we have
Us =
λ
2
[
1 + exp
(
− 1|S|
∑
i∈S
log(1 +
1
XiR
)
)]
−R, (17)
with
Xi =
m2(|S| − 1)
2dη2T
∑
j∈S νj
(
1− (|S| − 1)νi∑
j∈S νj
)
. (18)
Taking the second order derivative of Us with respect to R,
we have
∂2Us
∂R2
=
λg
2R2
( 1
|S|
∑
i∈S
1
XiR+ 1
)2
− 1|S|
∑
i∈S
2XiR+ 1
(XiR+ 1)2

≤ λg
2R2
(
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
−2XiR
(XiR+ 1)2
)
< 0,
where
g = exp−
(
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
log(1 +
1
XiR
)
)
.
Therefore, the utility function of the server in (17) is strictly
concave with respect to R for R > 0. Since the value of Us
in (17) approaches 0 when R approaches 0 and goes to −∞
when R goes to ∞, there exists a unique maximizer R∗ that
can be computed through either bisection or Newton’s method.
V. NUMERICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our incentive
mechanism in various scenarios. We assume that the privacy
value parameter of each user is uniformly distributed over
[1, νmax], where νmax is the maximum privacy value. We
set system parameter λ = 20, model dimension d = 1000,
stepsize η = 0.1, number of iterations T = 500, and data size
m = 1000. We take the number of participating users and
the utilities of the server and users as our evaluation metrics.
We mainly conduct simulations to study the impact of the
number of users and the range of privacy value on these three
evaluation metrics. We use the maximum privacy value νmax
to represent the range of privacy value. In all simulations that
study the impact of the number of users n, we set νmax = 5
and vary the value of n from 100 to 1000. In all simulations
that study the impact of the range of privacy value, we set
n = 1000 and vary the value of νmax from 2 to 10.
A. Number of participants
In our incentive mechanism, only users with positive privacy
budgets will participate in the federated learning, i.e., if i /∈
S, user i will not join the training. Therefore, we evaluate
the size of S in our mechanism under different settings of n
and νmax. In Figure 2(a), we can see that as the number of
users increases, the number of participants increases. This is
reasonable because if there are more users interested in the
federated learning task, more users will satisfy the condition
of belonging to S. In Figure 2(b), we can observe that as
the privacy value of users becomes more and more diverse,
the number of participants decreases since users with larger
privacy value will not be chosen.
B. Utility of Server
We first evaluate the impact of the number of users on the
server’s utility. As shown in Figure 3(a), the utility of the
server increases as the number of users increases. It is expected
to see that the influence of the number of users on the server’s
utility is diminishing. With the results in Figure 2(b), it is
reasonable that in Figure 3(b) the utility of the server decreases
as the privacy value becomes more diverse.
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Figure 2: The number of participating users under different
settings of the number of users and the maximum privacy
value.
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Figure 3: Server’s utility under different settings of the number
of users and the maximum privacy value.
C. Utility of User
We demonstrate users’ utilities under different settings of n
and νmax by showing the average utility of all users with the
corresponding standard deviation. In Figure 4(a), the average
and variance of users’ utilities decrease with the number of
users since more competitions are involved. In Figure 4(b),
with the results in Figure 2(b), it is expected to see that users’
utilities increases on average and becomes more diverse with
the maximum privacy value.
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Figure 4: The utility of users under different settings of the
number of users and the maximum privacy value.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have designed an incentive mechanism that
can be used to motivate users with private data to participate
in federated learning tasks. Our mechanism allows the cloud
server to offer monetary rewards to compensate users for their
privacy losses that occurs in the federated learning. We have
adopted a two-stage Stackelberg game to model the utility
maximization of the server and users. We have derived the
best strategies for the server and users via solving the Stack-
elberg equilibrium. Through extensive numerical simulations,
we have demonstrated the effectiveness of the mechanism.
In future work, we plan to study the incentive design for
federated learning tasks considering other costs of users, such
as communication and computation cost.
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